on the structure of scientific revolutions, Hempel (1965 Hempel ( , 1966 on the testability of scientific hypotheses and concept formation through operationalism, Levins (1966) and Wimsatt (1981) on the necessity for the robustness of particular theorems, and Lakatos (1976 Lakatos ( , 1978 on the progression of scientific research programs. Others have added to the debate by questioning the inherent lack of objectivity (Atkinson 1985) or the central role heuristics play (Wimsatt 1981) in the enterprise called science. In disciplines such as fundamental physics, in which mathematical models are constructed using operationally defined concepts and variables that can be measured with great accuracy (e.g., Newton's model for the gravitational attraction between bodies possessing mass), the enterprise produces testable hypotheses and theories with explanatory relevance (i.e., the phenomenon is expected to occur when specific conditions, described by the theory, are met)-two factors that are minimally required for a scientific theory (Hempel 1966) .
Population ecology as a scientific enterprise, however, is peppered with hypotheses that are not testable and theories that lack or have, at best, weak explanatory relevance. Two examples are the competitive exclusion principle and food web theory. The competitive exclusion principle is not testable because its formulation is confounded with the definition of a niche: If the test fails, one can recover the principle by redefining the niches for the populations by Wayne M. Getz tested (see Peters 1991) . Moreover, none of the current food web theories has sufficient explanatory power to be used to predict, with reasonable confidence, the number of trophic levels or the degree of omnivory in a web assembled on a particular resource flux in a precisely defined physical environment. Indeed, food web theory and empirical findings are often at odds with one another. Some food web models predict that the more species that are present in a community, the less interconnected the various species should be if their interactions are to be stable (Pimm 1984) , whereas several empirical studies suggest the opposite (Strong 1992 
, Polis and Strong 1996, Fagan 1997).
The difficulties in formulating scientific theories in population ecology are due in part to three characteristics of biological populations: First, the objects that constitute biological populations (i.e., individuals) are sufficiently different from one another, and the ensembles of objects (i.e., the populations themselves) are sufficiently small, that together they often conspire to make deviations in the mean traits of individuals more critical than the mean traits of individuals across each population itself; second, the traits in question often cannot be precisely or even objectively measured (e.g., behavioral traits typically defy unambiguous operational definitions); and third, the lack of repeatability of experiments, especially for largescale studies, constrains the ability to adequately test hypotheses. Instead, the hard core of the theory is corrupted by what Lakatos (1976) refers to as the protective belt of auxiliary assumptions that, in the worst case, renders the theory completely untestable.
In developing a thermodynamical theory of ensembles of molecules in a gas, physicists can reasonably assert that all molecules differ only in their velocities, that ensembles are big enough so that only average velocities (and sometimes variance) need be considered, and that experiments on gases are repeatable under laboratory conditions. By contrast, a theory of population dynamics is severely compromised by the fact that physiology and behavior are highly variable among individuals and are influenced by both genetics and nonreplicable environmental histories. Furthermore, some of the central problems in population ecology relate to understanding the structure and trajectory of systems that are each sufficiently different to be regarded effectively as one-of-a-kind. Thus, it is not surprising that a number of practicing ecologists, as reviewed by Peters (1991; but see Haila 1997), seriously question the scientific content of ecology and regard the discipline as "scientifically weak."
If it is so difficult to do science in ecology, why bother? This question can be separated into two parts: First, why study ecology? Second, when studying ecology, what are the appropriate methods to use? The answer to the first question is that beyond the sheer pleasure some scientists derive from being involved in this enterprise, managing ecosystems or at least predicting the trajectory of certain ecosystems is critical to the future well-being of human society (e.g., if global warming cannot be forestalled, society should at least anticipate and prepare for the consequences).
My answer to the second question is that the scientific approach is better than any other approach. ( Dayton (1980) , who expressed the sentiment that "ecology often seems dominated by theoretical bandwagons driven by charismatic mathematicians, lost to the realization that good ecology rests on the foundation of natural history and progresses by the use of proper scientific method" (p. 18).
It is not clear what Dayton meant by "proper scientific method," and no universal prescription exists on how to do science in all fields. In fact, the differences between modeling populations of animals and populations of molecules suggest that it is not appropriate to mimic in ecology the way models are used in the physical sciences. Theory in the physical sciences is nomothetic (i.e., based on general laws), even though it may have begun heuristically and is arguably still heuristical (Wimsatt 1981 ). In the biological sciences, theory is certainly heuristical, and it is debatable whether theories in biology (specifically evolutionary biology) may ever become nomothetic (McIntyre 1997). Until population ecology becomes, if it ever does, a nomothetic science, the paradigms employing mathematics in population biology must necessarily account for the heuristic nature of theory. Furthermore, because the variability of the constituent elements is inherently greater in biological than in physical systems, the precision of models in population biology will, by and large, never approach the precision of those in the physical sciences.
The application of mathematical models in heuristic fields of knowledge is as much an art as a science. As used here, the word "art" means "skill as the result of knowledge and practice" (Brown 1993). What is the art of using models in explicative or predictive modes in population ecology? The answer is bound to be personal and subjective, depending on the experiences of individuals in acquiring their skills and their world views. As with other creative arts, the judgment of what are good models in population ecology is influenced by culture and, even, by fashion. In this article, I hope to give a sense of how reason can be dominated by historical precedent in the development and elaboration of models in population ecology. Because of the great breadth of this field, I touch on a very few case studies that have been selected only from areas in which I have worked. My purpose is not to provide a comprehensive review of even these areas, but to use my experience to relate what I have learned about modeling.
Models as vehicles for communicating concepts
The first principle of communicating concepts through models is that any genre of models has a conceptual hierarchy. Consequently, to fully appreciate the relative importance of the concepts embodied in the most elaborate models of the genre, it is necessary to understand the concepts embodied by the more basic models of that genre. The Lotka-Volterra genre of prey-predator models provides a good example. The starting point for these models is the process of net population growth modeled by the exponential differential equation dx -= rx dt which encapsulates the idea that a population at biomass density x will grow exponentially when r > 0 (Malthus 1798) and decay exponentially when r < 0. The first elaboration of the exponential growth model, in the context of population growth rather than prey-predator interactions, is the introduction of the concept of an environmental carrying capacity K. This concept assumes that an exponentially growing population will increasingly tax the resources in its environment to the extent that the per capita growth rate will decline linearly to zero as the population density increases to K. The following model of this process, most often called the logistic model (Verhulst 1838) dx ( x = rx 1 --dt K predicts that all nonzero populations will ultimately equilibrate (reach a steady state) at level K. The first elaboration of the exponential growth model in the direction of prey-predator interactions is to assume the following: The prey population biomass density x grows exponentially at a rate r = a in the absence of predators; the predator population biomass density y declines exponentially at a rate r = -d (d > 0) in the absence of prey; and biomass flows from the prey to the predator population at a rate that is proportional to the product of the two population densities (i.e., xy). The model of this process, developed independently by Lotka (1925) Several concepts are implicitly buried in these equations. First, be-
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cause the predator population declines exponentially in the absence of prey, the implicit assumption is that the individual predators have some mechanism of feeding off themselves (anabolism of stored tissue) or off one another (cannibalism of conspecifics). Second, the interaction (or extraction) term bxy embodies the concept of random encounters, in which b units of prey are consumed by each unit of predator at each encounter. The model thus does not account for the phenomenon of satiation. The parameter c in the model accounts for the fact that a unit of consumed prey converts to less than a comparable unit of predator, in part because of metabolic inefficiencies in converting prey mass into predator mass. Thus, if prey and predator are measured in the same units of biomass density, then the assumption c < 1 is required to ensure that biomass is not created spontaneously.
Although Volterra's (1926) analysis provides an illuminating first cut at a possible reason why certain predatory species of fish increased considerably more than their prey species in the Adriatic Sea as a result of reduced fishing activities during World War I, the assumption that predators decline exponentially in the absence of prey is particularly restrictive and should have been dispensed with early on in the development of the Lotka-Volterra genre of models. But it was not, because, as I argue below, historicity appears to be a conservative process.
One way to elaborate LotkaVolterra's prey-predator model is to replace the exponential growth concept ax with the logistic concept rx(1 -x/K) to account for densitydependent growth in the prey population. The model can also be elaborated by including a concept of predator satiation. The extraction term bxy implies that if the density of predators doubles, then the rate of extraction of prey doubles. This assumption seems reasonable. The extraction term bxy, however, implies equally that as the density of prey doubles, the amount of food taken by each predator also doubles. This second assumption may be reasonable when resources are scarce, but it is not reasonable when resources are abundant. When prey are abundant, each predator will become satiated and the rate at which prey are extracted will depend only on the density of predators. To account for prey-dependent satiation, it is necessary to replace the term bxy with by0(x), where o(x) is the "functional response," although the term "extraction function" is more descriptive.
All solutions to the original LotkaVolterra equations are known to exhibit undamped oscillations, with the amplitude determined by the initial conditions (Lotka 1925 , Volterra 1926 were analyzed without first analyzing Lotka and Volterra's original model and then the single elaborations analyzed on their own, it would not be clear how each process contributes to the overall properties of the model. Taking this step-by-step approach reveals that oscillations are inherent to predation and that these oscillations are damped by densitydependent growth in the prey population, but this damping is destabilized by a rapid onset of satiation in the predator.
The prey-predator models of Lotka and Volterra and their similarly structured competition equations, which were studied extensively by Gause in the 1930s (Gause 1934), became widely acclaimed by the middle of this century for their contributions to theoretical ecology. Hutchinson and Deevey (1949) , for example, wrote: "Perhaps the most important theoretical development in general ecology has been the application of the logistic by Volterra, Lotka, Gause, and others to cases where two species occupy the same universe" (p. 341). Given certain fundamental limitations of the LotkaVolterra equations (e.g., the exponential decay or "graceful anabolism" of the predators in the absence of prey when, in reality, individuals in many species would quickly die when starved), it is not surprising that in the second half of this century a dichotomy arose between the opinions of field-oriented ecologists, who believed that Lotka-Volterra theory was too simplistic to be of value, and theoreticians, who believed that understanding is gained through an analysis of yet another application of the Lotka-Volterra equations. By the mid-1970s, the rhetoric between the two groups reached calumnious proportions, with Levandowsky (1976) declaring "Few ecologists are interested now in these misleading equations, but mathematicians dote on them and are always trying to foist them off on us-a classic case of the drunkard who loses his watch in the dark but looks for it under the lamp post because that's where the light is" (p. 418).
Where does the truth lie? What has been the real value of the work done by Volterra, Lotka, and their successors? Certainly Gause (1934) was able to stand in brilliant fashion on the shoulders of Lotka and Volterra in producing his seminal work on two-species competition, especially his formulation of the competitive exclusion principle (see Gause 1970). Significant developments of Lotka and Volterra's preypredator equations, however, did not take place for another three decades, until they were recast in a graphical context by Rosenzweig and MacArthur (1963; see also Rosenzweig 1969 Rosenzweig , 1971 ), using the now-classical ideas of Holling (1959) on the form of prey extraction functions. In their analysis, Rosenzwieg and MacArthur demonstrated that the existence of a refugium for the prey or of a second limiting resource for the predator tends to stabilize prey-predator interactions. These and other concepts based on the work of Lotka and Volterra played a critical role in de-veloping the burgeoning field of theoretical ecology. It is equally true, however, that the field of theoretical ecology is littered with mathematical analyses of highly elaborated Lotka-Volterra models that are largely irrelevant to empirical ecologists.
In the strongly predictive fields of the physical sciences, the mismatch between predictions obtained from models and the most reliable empirical data provides the means to test models. In the field of population biology, in which mathematical models are often used to explain rather than predict, tests are more difficult. Perhaps one of the weaknesses of the way in which disciplines such as population biology are taught is that instructors tend to focus on "facts" and the state of current theories rather than on how to critically evaluate the frameworks behind the collection of these facts and probe for the weak points in the theories. A careful examination of the history of particular modeling genres in population biology can help to identify where it would have been useful to have been more critical of the theory as it developed.
Historicity in modeling
Like all human endeavors, modeling has a historical context that leaves its imprint on the creations of that endeavor. This fact is illustrated well by the following case, which-along with the Lotka-Volterra genre of models-is a second example of how historical and social factors bias the development of models.
In the early 1920s, Thompson (1924) They assumed that the attack rate was search limited rather than egg limited and argued that hosts and parasitoids would encounter one another at a rate that is proportional to the densities, N and P, of the two populations, where the factor of proportionality is a constant, a, that can be interpreted as "parasitoid lifetime area of search." The average attack rate per host individual, x = aP, is obtained by dividing the encounter rate by N, and the corresponding zero term of the Poisson distribution is f(N,P) = e-aP.
In both the Thompson and the Nicholson-Bailey models, the host population is assumed to increase exponentially in the absence of predators, and the dynamics of the interaction are equivalent to assuming that hosts attacked more than once still produce the same number of parasitoids (i.e., one in the case of solitary parasitoids and up to several hundred in the case of polyembryonic parasitoids; see Godfray 1994 with respect to the host population (i.e., the coefficient of variation of parasitoid density exceeds 1) will the host and parasitoid coexist at roughly steady levels from one generation to the next-turns out not to hold if the parasitoids are egg rather than search limited . Moreover, when the parasitoid is egg limited and the host has a relatively high intrinsic rate of increase, host-parasitoid interactions no longer hold steady and begin to oscillate for sufficiently aggregated parasitoid attack rates. This result may explain why some parasitoids are not able to regulate their hosts, even though theory suggests that they should be able to do so (Lane et al. in press).
One may argue that an assumption of "egg-limited attack rates" is unnecessary when host densities are relatively low and that the real challenge to the parasitoid is to find its host. One may also argue that an assumption of "search-limited attack rates" is unnecessary if hosts remain abundant. Because it is not known in advance whether a model will predict that abundant hosts will remain abundant or that scarce hosts will remain scarce when attacked by parasitoids, it is prejudicial to the analysis not to include both egg-and search-limited attack rates in the models. Including these is easy because both search-and egg-limited attack rates are special cases of the more general mean attack rate ex- contrasting with the purely conceptual or purely predictive approaches is the purely formal approach to building models using flows to link components of systems together to constitute the whole. This approach is epitomized by the compartmental ecological models that were the vogue during the heyday of the International Biological Programs' ecosystem studies of the 1960s and 1970s (McIntosh 1985, Hagen 1992) .
Another way to classify models is to categorize them as phenomenological, empirical, or mechanistic. A phenomenological approach focuses on a direct characterization of the holistic properties of the population without elaborating the underlying mechanisms that might be responsible for these properties.
An empirical approach requires that data guide the way in which autonomous and interactive processes are characterized or the way in which observed properties are described. Empirical approaches are never totally free of preconceived notions because these notions arise from biases in the way human sensory systems perceive nature: We can measure only what we can sense or design machines to sense (e.g., infrared radiation or sound frequencies outside the human auditory range). Furthermore, when a function is fitted to data, it is necessary to choose among families of functions, such as a polynomial of a particular degree, an exponential function, or various groups of orthogonal functions that have the general shape that is being looked for, but other than getting the general shape correct, the choice is ad hoc.
A mechanistic approach involves constructing models by considering the properties of the components of a system and how these parts interact. Individual-based models, which have experienced a recent surge because of the advent of high-speed computation (see DeAngelis and Gross 1992), often provide good examples of the mechanistic approach. The individual-based approach currently has a considerable following because of the failure of less detailed mechanistic models and of phenomenological models to adequately describe complex processes in population ecology. The individual-based approach has helped move ecologists beyond populationlevel models, but along with all Cartesian reductionist approaches, the individual-based approach is committed to the principle that "the parts are ontologically prior to the whole" ( Forbes's view seems to be as valid today as it was in 1887, whereas contemporary ecologists who eschew theory fail to understand that facts are not absolute but are profoundly influenced by mental constructs and the way humans perceive the world. Of all the possible data that can be collected, data are collected that are currently thought to be important (e.g., birth and death rates could be measured when, in fact, it might be more useful to measure energy consumption and respiration rates to answer questions that might be formulated in the future). Furthermore, of all the things that can be measured, only entities for which there are appropriate operational definitions can be measured (e.g., scientists know how to measure water's acidity or an object's temperature, but they might be stumped if asked to measure the brittleness of an object or the intelligence of an animal), and these operational definitions emerge hand in hand with concept formation in science (Hempel 1966 ).
Resolution and focus
Mathematical models, like other types of models, are always much less than, and of a substance much different from, the things they represent. A real art in ecological modeling is to select the appropriate level of resolution to convey a particular property of a real system. The resolution is never independent of the question, nor is the choice of which features in the real system to emphasize in the model and which to ignore. Thus, one cannot use a model of a deer population to ask a question about age-specific harvesting if the model does not partition the deer into suitable age classes. Moreover, there is no point in focusing much attention on factors that promote the survival of larvae in a honeybee colony if one only wants to investigate the efficiency of adult worker bees in collecting pollen and nectar.
Because modelers have not agreed on a method to determine the most appropriate level of resolution for modeling a particular system, they fall between two philosophical poles of minimal versus maximal levels of resolution that make sense for the problem at hand. At the maximalist end, modelers are drawn by the natural history imperative to elaborate the details; at the minimalist end, they are drawn by the theoretical imperative to encapsulate the details. Population modelers reaching their vocation through a degree in the biological sciences probably have a predilection, and certainly the training, for paying attention to detail. By contrast, those with a degree in the quantitative sciences probably have a predilection, and certainly the training, for abstraction. How can population modelers at either end of the spectrum avoid being too extreme in following their predilections? The answer lies in being precise about the motivations for building a model and then in focusng as sharply as possible on the question at hand (Starfield 1997).
In fundamental particle physics, the aesthetic of minimalism is the guiding spirit behind the quest for the "theory of everything." The subject matters of fundamental particle physics and population ecology are sufficiently different, however, so that the minimalist approach is of no value to population ecology. The appropriate level of resolution for a particular study in population ecology can be arrived at by taking a "bottom-up" or a "top-down" approach (Getz and Haight 1989): Modelers can either start by putting as many details as they can into the model and then simplifying as needs be (bottom up), or they can start with an integrated phenomenological description of the system at the lowest level of resolution that includes the structures and processes needed to address the problem of interest (top down). The finer the level of resolution at which the modeler begins, however, the greater the opportunity unwittingly to leave out important bits and pieces that contribute critically to the higher-level processes of interest. Thus, it is best to start at the coarsest level and to add detail until a level of resolution is obtained that appears to include all of the detail necessary to address the question at hand. I will demonstrate this approach in the context of two models: a discrete time model of population growth, and a set of differential equation models that take a "metaphysiological" view of population growth and interaction.
A much-ignored phenomenological principle An introduction to modeling the simplest of all populations-a population of annual flowers, univoltine insects, or any species that has discrete nonoverlapping generations- 
Population Density to find a function that is more generally applicable and conceptually satisfying than the generalized B&H function (Bellows 1981, Getz 1996).
In the generalized B&H function, the parameters can be interpreted as follows: The parameter r is the rate of increase before the self-regulation factors take effect (i.e., the densityindependent growth rate), the parameter K is the density at which the actual density-dependent growth rate is one-half the density-independent rate r, and the shape parameter y determines how rapidly or abruptly density-dependent effects set in around the critical density K (Figure 1) .
Despite the obvious phenomenological superiority of the generalized Ricker and B&H functions to the other five functions in Table 1 , as well as their superiority in fitting insect population data, especially the B&H form (Bellows 1981, Gillman and Crawley 1990), little attention has been paid to characterizing the region where density dependence in discrete populations with nonoverlapping generations sets in or to where and how abruptly density dependence takes effect. Furthermore, the generalized B&H model has been employed infrequently in population ecology, with the exception of a few fisheries dynamics studies (Shepherd 1982) , in which this function is better known as the Shepherd model. It turns out, however, that considerations of abruptness in the onset of density dependence lead to interesting insights into the evolution of resource competition in populations with nonoverlapping generations (Getz 1996, Schoombie and Getz in press). In particular, in these populations competition among young for resources should be abrupt (i.e., contestlike) if the population has the potential at low densities to more than double in each generation and not abrupt (i.e., scramblelike) if the population does not have this growth potential.
Again, it is not clear why most population modelers have ignored the phenomenological limitations of the first five growth-rate functions in Table 1 , unless the activity of modeling in population ecology is regarded as having a strong sociological component that all too often overshadows the critical scientific component. As students, population ecologists are steeped in the modeling paradigm of the period, which differs not only by field, but also by subfield within theoretical and applied population ecology. Once population ecologists become mature practitioners, they often remain confined within their subfields and continue to elaborate rather than eviscerate the theory they have learned.
Time scales and the functional response
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Forbes (1887), as quoted earlier, made a plea for the inclusion of deductive reasoning in the theninfant field of ecology. The development by Lotka and Volterra of their prey-predator model was an exercise in deductive reasoning that was innovative and groundbreaking for the field of theoretical ecology, but the model itself was ultimately too far removed from reality to be useful in its unmodified form. An important and much-hailed step forward in modifying the Lotka-Volterra prey-predator model was taken by C. S. Holling (1959) with his work on the rates at which consumers (predators) are able to forage for resources (prey) in situations in which these rates are a function of the densities of resources. These rates, widely know in ecology as the "functional response" curves, are incorporated into the Lotka-Volterra models in terms of the function 0(x), as discussed earlier. The most important feature of the curves describing these functions is that they account for satiation of the consumers in the presence of abundant resources.
The simplest form for the functional response that includes the notion of satiation (Holling 1959 The misconception in these arguments is that discrete time equations (e.g., Nt+ 1 = R(N})Nt) are inherently more accurate or more reliable than differential equations (e.g., dxldt = r(x)x) in modeling event-driven processes. The real issue, when choosing between discrete and continuous equations and also between individual-and population-based equations to model a particular phenomenon, is the question of scale: spatial, temporal, and relational. The appropriate relational scale depends on the variation associated with individual interactions averaged to obtain the dynamics of the population as a whole. It takes "zillions" (10 to the power of a number around 20) of tiny molecules rushing in all directions, but with a bias toward a particular direction, to create a macroscopic flow of "air" or "water" in that direction.
By contrast, in population ecology, variation among individuals is sufficiently high and numbers sufficiently low that differential equations can never be expected to have the accuracy of models of physical processes. But this fact does not imply that discrete equations provide better models than differential equations. First, some events, such as deaths, may be stochastic (i.e., distributed in time according to some particular probability distribution). Thus, difference equation models, like differential equation models, are based on average rates. Furthermore, a basic flaw of difference equation models, such as Nt+ 1 = sbNt, is that the average survival rate, s, will invariably depend on density, N, which is known only at time t; however, this average survival rate will itself change as N changes over the interval [t,t + 1]. Because this change in survival cannot be known without knowing how N will change and the converse, this impasse can be resolved only if survival, s(N), is an integrable function of N. Thus, if it is possible to make a particular discrete equation exact using integration (which is not always possible because not all functions can be integrated analytically), then it is necessary to use the very tool (i.e., calculus) that has been ruled out as being an inadequate approximation when applied to the nonsmooth changes in populations.
It is not possible to escape from this chicken-and-egg dilemma if difference equations are considered to be more appropriate than differential equations for modeling population process. The art of modeling ecological populations is inextricably linked to selecting the scales of processes that are most appropriate for addressing the questions at hand and then formulating either difference or differential equations that express these processes as accurately as possible without elaborating details that belong to higher levels of resolution.
If this procedure is followed in selecting extraction functions for prey-predator or, more generally, for any consumer-resource system, then the appropriate form for the extraction function depends on a number of issues that relate to questions of scale. I have considered this question with a colleague, Sebastian Schreiber, at Western Washington University (manuscript in preparation), in the context of how the demographic time scale of the consumer relates to that of the resource (are they the same, as in lions preying on zebra? or is one at least one order of magnitude longer, as in fish feeding on algae?) and how these two time scales relate to a "patchdynamics" or interaction time scale (i.e., the rate at which consumers are able to smooth out heterogeneities in the density of the resource as they move from high-to low-density patches or the rate at which the patches themselves flow past a sessile consumer in a resource stream). We have found that different assumptions about time scales lead to dramatically different conclusions about the ability of two consumers to coexist on one heterogeneous resource.
A unified approach
In search of generality, ecologists strive to formulate a population equation that is conceptually independent of the position of the population in the trophic hierarchy-that is, primary producer, herbivore, carnivore, omnivore, detritivore, or top predator (Getz 1984 (Getz , 1991 (Getz , 1994 An alternative to the demographic approach that is favored more by plant than animal ecologists and that is within the class of individual-based rather than aggregated models is the physiologically structured population approach (de Roos 1997). This approach can be traced back to a seminal paper by Sinko and Streifer (1967) An individuals-based physiological approach to modeling population interactions and trophic structure rapidly becomes very detailed (Gutierrez 1996 ). An aggregated approach to modeling trophic interactions that uses physiological ideas but has the relative simplicity of aggregated demographic models is the metaphysiological approach for describing the change, Ax, in biomass density, x, of a species. The fundamental equation for this approach is Ax = (G -M -Q)At where G, M, and Q are the respective growth, metabolic, and mortality rates associated with the population in question. Compared with the demographic approach, a term for deaths is retained, but a term for births has been replaced by the biomass growth rate, G. A term M, for metabolic attrition, is added. This fundamental metaphysiological equation assumes that the population is closed, but immigration or emigration can be added if necessary.
The metaphysiological approach is based on the notion that populations grow because individuals extract resources from the environment at a rate proportional to their biomass. These extracted resources are then ingested, digested, and assimilated, with individuals either gaining weight themselves or reproducing (Getz 1991 (Getz , 1993 (Getz , 1994 . Thus, the total biomass density, rather than the number of individuals, is the variable that best describes the population at an aggregated level, and the biomass of specific tissue types (e.g., leaves, stems, and roots in plants, or some functional notion of active versus storage tissues for animals and plants) are the variables that best describe the population at higher levels of resolution (Getz and OwenSmith in press). Ginzburg (in press) describes the notion that the growth rate of a population depends on the rate at which the population extracts resources, rather than on the density of the resources themselves, as the "biomass conversion principle" and argues that the many trophic models that violate this principle are logically flawed.
Lotka-Volterra prey-predator equations are formulated on the assumption that the growth rate of the predator is a linear function of the resources (i.e., prey) extracted per unit predator. Assuming that the growth of a predator or consumer is a hyperbolic rather than a linear function of the extracted resources, the problem of the consumer population decaying exponentially in the absence of resources can be avoided; in this case, the consumer population will collapse to zero. Furthermore, if extraction is a general type II functional response, then the hyperbolic growth-rate assumption yields a logistic model, for which the carrying capacity, K, is explicitly expressed in terms of extraction efficiency, growth-rate parameters, and the density of the underlying resource flux (Getz 1991 (Getz , 1993 . Moreover, this analysis demonstrates that if a Holling type II functional response is used instead of the general type II or ratio-dependent type II functional responses, then the carrying capacity is infinite. Thus, the metaphysiological approach provides insight that has not been forthcoming in the more ubiquitous demographic approach: A self-interference term in the functional response is essential for the environmental carrying capacity to be finite if the resources are considered to be a constant background flux (e.g., light or nutrients in a stream).
Conclusion
Whenever a novel approach is taken to modeling population growth and interactions, a new perspective is generally obtained. In some cases, the knowledge gained may be only that the new approach is not useful.
But in other cases, the knowledge gained provides important insights (e.g., the effects of egg-limited attack rates on the stability of hostparasitoid interactions, the central role of self-interference in determining the carrying capacity of an environment, or the abruptness of the onset of density dependence in determining the evolutionarily stable form that competition takes in populations with discrete, Gurney et al. 1983 , Gutierrez 1996 . The application of preypredator age-structured models by Murdoch, Briggs, and colleagues to host-parasitoid dynamics has helped to explain, among other things, the relative importance of the invulnerability of the different host stages to parasitoid attack in stabilizing hostparasitoid interactions. The analysis has also revealed that an invulnerable adult stage is much more critical to stability than an invulnerable juvenile stage (for a review, see Mills and Getz 1996) . Innovative approaches in modeling ecological populations have, unfortunately, been less frequent than in the physical sciences, where tests of theory are more rigorously linked to how well predictions from models fit observed data. One cannot underestimate how important it is to have an objective test of a model when trying to overcome the status quo of the theory in a field. Data seem to be far more powerful in providing such a test than rational arguments that are based purely on phenomenological principles. Even in the innovative work of Murdoch and associates, Lotka-Volterra once more rises to the fore for no good reason other than that it is currently the most acceptable first step to analyzing prey-predator interactions. This acceptance, however, appears to be based on familiarity rather than logic: The underlying assumption of the Lotka-Volterra equation that consumers decline exponentially in the absence of predators is, for example, almost never questioned, even though it is troublesome, especially when the consumers are parasitoids and despite the fact that an easy fix is available (i.e., using the biomass conversion principle and a hyperbolic rather than linear growth function, as discussed in the previous section).
The reluctance of modelers, especially younger modelers, to be innovative in population ecology in the absence of data to argue their case could well be related to reducing the risk of their manuscripts and grants being rejected by peer reviewers. The exception that could prove this rule is Bellows's (1981) demonstration, using a collection of independent sets of insect population data, that the generalized B&H function fits the data better than any of the other functions listed in Table 1 . Nevertheless, in the absence of suitable data to support one model over another, most modelers continue to use functions that violate the principle that the maximum rate at which density dependence increases its effect on the population should not, in general, occur at the lowest population densities.
Ironically, perhaps by becoming more rational in the choice of models, it will be accepted that modeling in population ecology is more an art than a rigorous science (indeed, the validity of ecological models is invariably in question; Kirchner et al. 1996) . The art of modeling in population ecology may have more to do with fixing what is most glaringly wrong with models than with finding the "right" model. The art of modeling also has much to do with lateral thinking (De Bono 1971) and being able to draw on ideas and experience from related, and even disparate, fields. Tony Starfield, for example, who is one of the most effective modelers in wildlife management today (e.g., Starfield and Bleloch 1991, Starfield et al. 1994 , Starfield 1997 ), also has more than two decades of modeling experience in rock mechanics. In his view (Tony Starfield, University of Minnesota, personal communication), the art of modeling in population ecology is in "asking the right questions and being imaginative about how one develops the model, explores the model world, and interprets the results."
